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 Abstract 
 
 
 
 
 
Government procurement is a market accounting for more than 15% of the 
gross world product. Irrespectively of the market size, government 
procurement receives little academic attention and research efforts in the basic 
functions of estimating and tendering are restricted to the construction 
industry. As a result, application-specific tools based on analytical models are 
unavailable to the general practitioner who relies mainly on experience and 
intuition for the bid pricing. An industry-independent software system based on 
the Monte Carlo simulation which integrates cost engineering with tendering 
theory was developed and its effectiveness was tested against real projects. 
Through the discussion on the various stages of the system development, a 
number of methods and models are presented and the highly managerial nature 
of the topic is revealed. 
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Introduction 
 
1.1 Background & Motivation 
Government procurement is a substantial market whose size is estimated by the 
Global Trade Negotiations Center at 10 to 15% of GDP for developed countries 
and around 20% of GDP for developing countries (1).  In the European Union 
(EU), government procurement accounted for 13.5% of EU GDP in 2007 (2). The 
way a public authority gains access to goods is regulated by a web of 
international treaties, national legislations and local policies. In Greece, public 
procurement law was harmonized with the EU directives 2004/18/EC and 
2004/17/EC as a general framework but there are more specific national laws 
per procurement category (3). Furthermore, government agencies, e.g. 
municipalities and the National Health System, procure according to agency-
specific policies.  
There are different legislations which regulate the public sector procurements 
throughout most of the world, all with the same objectives, to prevent waste 
and fraud, and to provide transparency. To achieve their objectives, almost 
universally, the legislations converge to the practice of competitive, sealed 
bidding.  
The process of competitive bidding starts with the publication of the Invitation 
(or Call) to Tender (ITT). ITT is the formal document which describes the scope 
of the procurement and the details of the bidding process. From the bidder’s 
point of view, the most important parts of the ITT are the deadline of the 
competition, the technical details of the goods, the required services, the 
required supporting documentation, the required temporal validity and, of 
course the budget. Moreover, the ITT also describes the required form of the 
bidding documentation which, in most cases, consists of three discrete folders, 
the technical offer, the financial offer and the supporting documents.     
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The technical offer provides evidence that the proposed goods have the quality 
and the characteristics that cover the technical details of the ITT and that the 
bidder has the technical skills and the experience to complete the project. The 
supporting documents’ folder provides evidence of the bidder’s financial status, 
usually in the form of a bid bond, the legal form of the bidder’s company and 
other documents required by the ITT. Finally, the financial offer provides the 
bidder’s price either per line item or as a lump sum and the temporal validity. 
The bids whose technical offer and the supporting documents are according to 
the ITT are called responsive bids. On the date referred in the ITT, the 
competition’s committee unseals the bidding documentation and the lowest 
responsive bid is awarded the contract. 
There are two discrete functions which result in the bid price, the estimating 
function and the tendering function. During the estimating function, a 
specialized person or team of the bidding firm, called the estimator uses the 
information in the ITT to build a Bill of Quantities (BoQ) which includes all the 
resources required to complete the project. The BoQ is usually populated by 
materials, labor and equipment. The estimator tries to predict the quantity and 
the cost of each line item at the time of the project implementation as 
accurately as possible. The result of the estimating function is the sum of all 
costs in the BoQ, which is called the baseline cost of the project or the direct 
costs.  
The tendering function is much less technical and much more managerial. When 
the baseline cost is estimated, the bidding firm adds a percentage or, less usual, 
a lump sum to come up with the bidding price. This percentage or lump sum, 
which is called the markup, should be large enough to cover all the indirect costs 
or the general overhead of the company, the project’s risk and to add value to 
the company, in other words profit. At the same time, the markup should be 
low enough for the firm’s bid to be competitive.  
Irrespectively of the market size, government procurement receives little, if any, 
academic attention and, unfortunately, any research in estimating and 
tendering is restricted to construction and civil engineering. In the field of 
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baseline cost estimating, the work of Curran (4) on the range estimating in 1976 
received considerable attention and eventually led to the formulation of the 
Association for the Advancement of Cost Engineering and the publication of the 
Total Cost Management Framework (5). However, the latter evolved to a 
framework of Project Management and the pre-project phases are barely 
covered in a chapter.  
The papers of Friedman (6) in 1956 and Gates (7) in 1967 laid the foundations 
of the tendering theory. The tendering theory tries to statistically predict the 
markup which maximizes profit and the probability to win the bid by taking into 
consideration (known) competitors’ past behavior. Since then, little progress 
has been made as most publications on the subject fall in following three 
categories. The first category merely criticizes these two first papers for absence 
of mathematical derivation, the second category tries to fit the competitors’ 
behavior in a single probability density function, while the third category 
researches the (absence of) impact of the theory on the practitioners.   
This absence of use of any analytical model or objective method during the 
calculation of bidding price of any of the author’s past and present workplaces 
and the lack of application-specific tools in the market were the prime 
motivations for the subject of the present dissertation. Research findings 
militate the author’s sense that competitive bidding outcomes are matters of 
experience, intuition and chance: even the largest construction companies in 
the UK, with over a £100m turnover report personal experience, intuition and 
guessing, higher than statistical formulas and software tools as methods of price 
estimating (8).  
There are two factors which make even more essential the use of a systematic 
approach in competitive bidding, the context and the industry characteristics. 
In low margin industries such as the information and communication technology 
(ICT) industry, the winner’s curse is always highly probable. Moreover, the 
statutory minimum temporal validity of the offer which is set at 120 days, in an 
industry where prices changes on a daily basis, makes not only the prediction of 
the cost difficult but even the BoQ volatile as many of the line items will have 
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reached their end-of-life by that period. Furthermore, companies dealing with 
the Greek public sector face a number of unique uncertainties.  
For example, although in recent years there are some legal efforts to defy it, the 
Greek public sector is notoriously late in its payment but very quick in taxing un-
collected income. The fact is that there are no certainties in how long the 
payment will be late.   
 
1.2 Aim & Objectives 
The aim of the present dissertation is to develop a system which generates the 
optimal bid price for the sealed-bid procurements of the public sector in Greece. 
The system should be strictly based on research findings and scientific methods 
but it should be oriented to the general practitioner in the ICT industry.  
The first objective towards the aim is to define the components of a bid price in 
more depth than the general cost-plus-markup approach. Subsequently, the 
second objective is to explore the scientific methods and the research findings 
on the estimate of each and every component of the bid price.  
As the system is oriented towards the general practitioner, the third objective 
is to extract the design requirements and constraints based on the research 
findings available on the topic of tendering practice and especially in three 
fields: why practitioners do not use analytical models, which are the factors 
considered in tendering decisions and which are the factors which lead to 
inaccurate estimates.  
The fourth objective is to pick the methods which fit both the aim and the design 
and to combine them in a single software system. Finally, the last objective is to 
provide evidence that the system can actually work in practice.   
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1.3 Contribution 
The results of the present dissertation provide evidence that existing models 
and methods in the field of estimating and tendering, which were primarily 
developed for the construction industry, can be applied in any industry involved 
in government procurement. Moreover, the dissertation findings prove that the 
development of a system which integrates the above models and methods not 
only is feasible but it has also great advantages for the general practitioner: it 
requires both minimum investment and no knowledge of the models 
themselves, it is fool-proof via the Minimum Acceptable Bid safety net and it 
can accelerate the bid preparation process. Finally, the system inputs 
themselves underline the fact that the functions of estimating and tendering are 
not technical but highly managerial.  
 
1.4 Thesis Structure 
Thesis structure follows the flow of the objectives. In this first chapter, 
background information on the subject is presented and the aim and objectives 
of the dissertation are set.  
Next chapter, the Tendering & Estimating, after defining the components of a 
bid price, explores the various methods and researches which are published on 
this broad subject. In these chapters, the functions of estimating and tendering 
are faced separately and special reference is made in the Monte Carlo method.  
The third chapter, Model Formulation, meets the objectives of setting the 
design’s requirement and constraints as well as the developing of the model. 
Most of its part is a walk through the methods used and the implementation of 
the various subsystems. 
The fourth chapter, Proof of Concept, provides evidence that the system 
actually works. The system was tested against real projects and the chapter 
illustrates the results and the comparison of the outcomes.  
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In the first part of the last chapter, Conclusions and Limitations, there is a 
retrospective discussion on whether or not the proposed system fulfills the aim 
of the dissertation and the design’s requirements. Then, some interesting 
managerial implications on the bidding process which have been aroused during 
the development of the model are present. Finally, in the last part, there is a 
discussion on the limitations of the model, some paradoxes which are observed 
by its use and how future work can further improve the model.    
In the Appendix some notes are gathered on the implementation of the model 
using just a single spreadsheet and a simulation add-in.   
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Estimating & Tendering 
 
As far as the pricing is concerned, Figure 1 illustrates the zoology of the 
government procurement. Each project’s budget is announced by the 
contracting authority and it represents the price ceiling for the project. There 
are two areas where a bid can fall: the loser’s area between the ceiling the 
second lower bid and the winner’s area just below the second lower bid. 
However, the winner’s area has a sub-area which lies below the project’s actual 
cost threshold. Usually, nobody desires to bid in this area, but there are plenty 
of megaprojects gone sour and millions of less celebrated examples.  
 
Figure 1 – Competitive Bidding Environment 
 
To win a contract is a trivial matter. Although in real life there are clauses for 
such cases, a company can bid far below the cost and win with every confidence. 
However, to win and survive is a different matter. Practically, the perfect bid is 
just a cent below the second lower bid. It is very tempting for a company to aim 
for the perfect bid, but it involves a lot of guesswork and there is definitely no 
scientific model for such a prediction. A more pragmatic aspiration for a 
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company would be to avoid winner’s curse and to secure enough workload to 
cover its expenses and growth.    
Textbooks on construction accounting and bid management (9) (10) (11) are 
generally agree on the fact that a bid price is comprised by two parts, the cost 
and the markup. However, they generally disagree on what accounts as cost and 
what must be part of the markup. From the author’s point of view, such a 
debate is pointless: there are costs that a company must estimate correctly to 
avoid winner’s curse such as baseline cost, risk and general overhead and there 
are things a company wants which are part of the tendering function such as 
profit and strategic objectives.  
 
2.1 Estimating 
As discussed earlier in the Introduction chapter, estimating is the function of 
calculating every possible cost involved in the fulfillment of the contract. 
Estimating has both technical aspects and industry-independent aspects. The 
technical aspects has to do with the completion of the BoQ in such a way which 
minimizes baseline cost while maintains the tender responsive. The non-
technical aspects involves the estimation of risk and indirect costs. The sum of 
all estimating costs, named here the Minimum Acceptable Bid (MAB), is the 
threshold below which lies the winner’s curse area. 
  
2.1.1 Baseline Cost 
Baseline cost or direct costs can be defined as any burden that a company is not 
obliged to take if it loses the contract. The population of the BoQ with line items 
and their respective quantities and the subsequent calculation of the baseline 
cost is an industry-dependent technical matter and far beyond the scope of the 
present dissertation.  
For the system development purposes, baseline cost or total reported cost is 
the sum of all costs reported for each line by their suppliers or subcontractors 
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at the time of the initial market research. Fluctuations on the prices and other 
line-item-specific risks are issues involved in the calculation of the contingency.    
Interestingly, most of the causes of inaccuracy in baseline cost estimating as 
reported by contractors in (8) are nothing but technical: 
i. Insufficient time for estimating 
ii. Low participation in estimating by the site team 
iii. Lack of review of cost estimate by management 
iv. Poor feedback on accuracy previous estimates 
v. Pressure from management 
vi. Removal of estimate padding by management 
vii. Lack of adequate guidelines for estimating 
viii. Inaccurate production data used in estimating  
ix. Lack of historical data on past estimates 
x. Estimators lacks of data processing techniques  
 
2.1.2 Risk & Contingency 
Project Management Institute (PMI) defines risk in its PMBOK as an uncertain 
event or condition that, if it occurs, has a positive or negative effect on the 
projects objectives (12). The same source divides sources of risk to “known 
unknowns” and “unknown unknowns”. Known unknowns are the risks for which 
the estimator is aware of and he can quantify their costs. The sum of these costs 
is referred to as contingency. PMI also mentions that unknown unknowns 
cannot be managed although they may be addressed by applying a general 
contingency based on past experience with similar projects.  
Again, sources of risks are industry-dependent factors and their identification is 
beyond the scope of the present work. For example, as far as government 
procurement of technology goods in Greece is concerned, the main sources of 
uncertainty are the considerable price fluctuation of hardware over time, the 
unavailability of the proposed goods on the delivery date and the irregularity of 
the cash inflows.  
~ 15 ~ 
 
Although traditional percentage, or as it is referred the “10% syndrome” (13), 
seems to prevail in practice (14), various contingency estimating methods was 
proposed over time: estimating using risk analysis (ERA) (15), the method of 
moments, Monte Carlo simulation (16), regression analysis (17) and even 
artificial neural networks (18). To calculate contingency, the proposed system 
uses a combination of the range estimating technique along with NPV analysis 
and Monte Carlo simulation, all of which are discussed in detail in §3.2 and §3.4.  
 
2.1.3 Indirect Costs & General Overhead 
From the author’s point of view, as indirect costs should be considered only the 
expenses that a company will have if it no tenders are being won. All these costs 
falls under the General Overhead category. However, many companies in the 
construction industry, apart from general overhead, include indirect 
construction costs, such as site overheads, risk margin, escalation, and even 
profit in the indirect cost budget (19).  
General overhead is a well-defined accounting issue. Peterson in (11) lists more 
than thirty items to include in a general overhead budget from bad debts and 
depreciation to employ wages and salaries. Although well-defined, the general 
overhead issue is crucial as in a (healthy) contracting company it consumes more 
than 12% of its revenues or over two thirds of its profits (11). The real problem 
is how to fairly allocate general overhead among the various projects in the pre-
tender phase when the competition outcome is unknown.  
The only research available on the subject (19) refers that in practice companies 
use one of the three methods to allocate indirect costs: 
i. as a percentage on measured works; 
ii. as a lump sum in the preliminary bill; and  
iii. as a combination of both. 
However, when the contractors were asked if they could give guidance as to the 
size of the percentage adjustment, all declined from giving details.  
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Elaborate methods of cost allocation used to other disciplines with similarities 
to the tendering process such as the communication network pricing, may be 
incorporated: The contracting company provides services to the project team 
while a carrier provides services to its clients. In both cases, although the volume 
of work is unknown, the infrastructure should be in place in advance. The cost-
based pricing approaches (20) such as the Fully Distributed Cost, the Activity-
based Costing and the Flat Rate Pricing, used in communication networks can 
be adapted to fairly allocate general overhead to its tender. In fact, the break-
even volume of work analysis and the break-even contribution margin ratio 
analysis, which are integrated in the proposed system and are discussed in detail 
in §3.3, can be considered adaptations of the Flat Rate Pricing.  
 
2.2 Tendering  
Tendering is the process of making an offer in response to an invitation to bid. 
As far as the bidding price is concerned, tendering is the process of applying a 
markup over the baseline cost estimate. Markup definition is a complex process 
which not only should cover contingency, general overhead and profit, but it 
should also reflect the company’s strategy and understanding of its 
environment. According to the research findings of Ali H. Sash on the factors 
considered in tendering decisions by top UK contractors (21) the top factors that 
affect the bid/no bid decision and the markup size are: 
i. Need for work 
ii. Degree of difficulty 
iii. Number of competitors tendering 
iv. Experience in such projects 
v. Current work load 
vi. Client identity 
vii. Contract conditions 
viii. Project type 
ix. Past profit in similar projects 
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x. Project size 
xi. Risk involved 
xii. Completeness of the documents 
xiii. Rate of return 
xiv. Project cash flow 
xv. Availability of other projects 
The above findings agree with more recent researches for different places such 
as in (22) for Singapore and in (23) for Australia. 
The obvious objective of every participant who is bidding for a contract is to win 
the contract and at the same time to make some profit. In other words, every 
participant’s objective is to maximize his expected profit.  
 
2.2.1 Friedman’s Model & Tendering Theory 
The maximization of the expected profit is the main concern of the tendering 
theory. Tendering theory emerged as an outcome of the 1956 paper of 
Lawrence Friedman with the title “A Competitive-Bidding Strategy” (6). 
Friedman expressed the expected profit as a function of the amount bid for the 
contract: 
𝐸(𝑥) = 𝑃(𝑥)(𝑥 − 𝐶) 
Where, P(x) is the probability that a bid of x is the lowest and wins the contract 
and C is the estimated cost of fulfilling the contract or following the 
dissertation’s nomenclature the baseline cost. The concept of markup (m) is not 
directly mentioned in the paper, however as it can be expressed in terms of x 
and C as: 
𝑚 =
𝑥 − 𝐶
𝐶
 
and as C is constant, then P(x) = P(m) and the curve of E(x) in Figure 2, is identical 
with the ones illustrated in Figure 13. One way or another, the problem of 
determining the expected profit lies in determining the P(x) or P(m). 
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Figure 2 – Expected Profit vs. Amount Bid (Example from (6)) 
 
Friedman’s way of determining P(x) is through studying the bidding patterns of 
potential competitors from past encounters. Friedman normalized competitors’ 
bids by dividing them with our company’s cost estimate. This normalized bid is 
in every essence the concept of markup. Then, if there are enough previous 
contracts on which (competitor) A has bid, a pattern of A's bidding behavior 
relative to our cost estimates will emerge as a distinct distribution. 
The last sentence sparked a number of publications on the subject of which 
distinct distribution is appropriate for the application. Uniform (9) (24), normal 
(25) (26) and gamma (27) distributions were all proposed with sufficient 
theoretical basis but little experimental proof. From the author’s point of view, 
the discussion about the distinct distribution is outdated: if there are enough 
previous encounters with a competitor, there are the tools available to draw a 
custom distribution which describes in detail his or her bidding behavior. 
When the decision on the distinct distribution is made, the probability of 
winning by bidding x, P(x) is equal to the area right to the markup x/C (Figure 3).    
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Figure 3 – Bidding Patterns of Competitors (Example from (6)) 
 
The above expression is equal to say that the probability of winning the bid for 
any given amount x or any given markup m is equal to the probability of winning 
every competitor at the same time or: 
𝑃(𝑥) = 𝑃(𝑤𝑖𝑛𝐴, 𝑥) ∙ 𝑃(𝑤𝑖𝑛𝐵, 𝑥) ∙ 𝑃(𝑤𝑖𝑛𝐶, 𝑥) 
The assumptions of the Friedman’s model are that (a) the competitors are 
known and (b) the competitors’ behavior constantly follows the distinct 
distribution. In cases where the number of competitors is unknown, Friedman 
suggests that this number follow the Poisson distribution and he uses the 
concept of an ‘average bidder’, whose behavior can be described by a gamma 
distribution. The concept of the average bidder with some modifications is used 
in the proposed system not to assume unknown competitors but to draw a 
different strategy.    
The next major publication on the tendering theory was Gates’ “Bidding 
Strategies and Probabilities” in 1967 (7). Gates’ model leaves Friedman’s 
microeconomic view of a single bid and introduces a generalized economic 
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theory for pricing construction projects. Gates’ model estimates the probability 
to win a bid as: 
P(xi)= [∑
1-p(i')
p(i')
+ 1ki=2 ]
-1
  
Where p(i') is the probability of “our cost estimate” to be less than the 
competitor’s i bid. In a nutshell, Gates’ model suggests that the optimum 
markup is constant for any given group of competitors and variations of the 
prices are inevitable due to variations on the cost estimates.   
All other tendering theory models such as Carr’s (28), Pim’s (29) and Skitmore’s 
(30) are interpretations of the major models of Friedman and Gates.  
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System Formulation 
 
Based on the facts analyzed in the previous chapters, a system which calculates 
an optimal bid price (OBP) should macroscopically work according to the 
following equation: 
𝑂𝐵𝑃 = {
𝐵𝐶 ∙ (1 + 𝑂𝑀), 𝑖𝑓 𝐵𝐶 ∙ (1 + 𝑂𝑀) ≥ 𝑀𝐴𝐵 
𝑀𝐴𝐵, 𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒
 
Where, BC is baseline cost and OM is the optimal markup which maximizes the 
expected profit. MAB is the minimum acceptable bid which is equal to: 
𝑀𝐴𝐵 = 𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 + 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑑 
By using the above figure, the system guaranties that the bid price (a) maximizes 
the expected profit and (b) avoids the winner’s curse as no bid price is 
acceptable if it is lower than the MAB.  
For their effectiveness and their availability, five different techniques are 
integrated in the system to calculate the components of the equation: the range 
estimating technique, the break-even contribution margin ratio analysis, the net 
present value analysis, variations of the Friedman’s model and the Monte Carlo 
method.      
However, the system will continue the legacy of much of its components as very 
useful but generally ignored by the practitioner if it is not to take into account 
why analytical models fail to reach their audience. 
 
3.1 Design Requirements and Constraints  
Much of the scientific research in the field of estimating and tendering was 
involved in quantitative research on how contractors price their bids and why 
they still use mainly experience-based approaches. Table 1 summarizes their 
findings. A new product design approach was used to extract the business 
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requirements and the technical constraints of the system as the interpreted 
needs of the practitioners’ responses.  
Research Findings Interpreted Need Reference 
Analytical models are time 
consuming 
The system will use simple inputs (14), (31) 
Analytical models are too complex 
The user will not have to understand 
the system’s operation to use it 
(14), (31) 
Analytical models are insensitive to 
commercial exigencies of bidding 
practice 
The system will take into 
consideration commercial exigencies 
(14), (31) 
Analytical models do not take into 
consideration market competition 
The system will take into 
consideration market competition 
(32) 
Scientific models do not use 
information that is commonly used 
in practice 
The system will use only information 
that is used in practice 
(14) 
Scientific models increase the cost of 
the tendering process 
The system will be inexpensive and 
will use only readily available 
software and hardware 
(32), (33) 
Table 1 – Business Requirements & Technical Constraints 
One of the main sources of inaccuracies in cost estimating is the inefficient time 
and the practitioners find analytical models even more time consuming. One 
way to accelerate the process is to offload complex operations to the system 
and focus user’s efforts on filling out clearly defined inputs. The same stands 
true for the opinion that analytical models are too complex, as well. The system 
should be designed in such a way that a user will not have to understand its 
internal operations to use it.    
The most difficult part of the system design and its implementation is to take 
into consideration commercial exigencies and information that is commonly 
used in practice. Information commonly used in the decision making such as 
need for work and current workload, degree of difficulty of the project, client 
identity and contract conditions are hard to quantify and thus hard to be fed 
into a system.  
Finally, another research finding, the fact that analytical models do not take into 
consideration market competition is true only for estimating models. As 
tendering theory is part of the system, market competition consideration is 
inherited to the system.  
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3.2 Baseline Cost and Line Item Contingency Simulator 
The basis of the cost estimating process is the probabilistic technique of Range 
Estimating as published by M. Curran in (4) and standardized as the 
Recommended Practice No. 41R-08 (33) of the Association for the Advancement 
of Cost Engineering. A main advantage of this process is that the contingency 
involved due to risk for each line item is integrated in the price.  
The process starts with the formulation of the Bill of Quantities (BoQ). The BoQ 
contains all direct costs involved in the project. Depending on the project, direct 
costs include materials, logistics and labor. The information provided by the BoQ 
includes description, quantity, reported unit cost and trade credit in days. The 
sources of information for the reported unit cost and the trade credit are the 
suppliers and the subcontractors. For each line item in the BoQ, the bidding 
team based on its experience and/or on historical data assigns a maximum 
possible value and its minimum possible value.  
The Range Estimating technique integrates risk in the cost estimating by 
identifying critical items early in the process. RP No. 41R-08 defines a critical 
item as “one whose actual value can vary from its target, either favorably or 
unfavorably, by such a magnitude that the bottom line cost of the project would 
change by an amount greater than its critical variance”. The critical variance for 
detailed estimates (AACE Classes 1, 2) (5) is defined as ±0.2% of the baseline 
cost.  
The impact of all line items which are found critical should be investigated using 
Monte Carlo simulation. The inputs of the simulation are the probability density 
functions (PDFs) of the critical items’ cost. However, as such detailed 
information is rarely available in practice and furthermore, cost rarely conforms 
to a specific type of PDF, the RP No. 41R-08 proposes the use of the triangular 
distribution as a reasonable approximation. In Figure 4, the triangular 
distribution is formulated by the reported unit cost (c), the maximum possible 
value (b) and the minimum possible value (a) from the BoQ.   
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Figure 4 – Triangular Distribution 
 
Non-critical items participates in the total cost simulation as constant values of 
reported cost. The Monte Carlo simulation output is the PDF of the total 
baseline cost.   
 
Figure 5 – Total Baseline Cost simulation output 
 
The sum of the baseline cost and the contingency which will be used to further 
calculate the bid price, are extracted by the total baseline cost PDF based on the 
risk attitude of the management. A risk-neutral approach is to choose the 
median because in that point there is equal chance of cost underrun and cost 
overrun (34). The more risk-averse the attitude, the lower the chance of cost 
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overrun that will be chosen. There are cases such as in (35) where institutions 
report baseline cost at median and contingency as the difference between the 
50% and the 80% confidence level. In the example of Figure 5, the risk-neutral 
approach is used and the simulated baseline cost plus the contingency is 4,751€. 
Although range estimating technique addresses various aspects of line item cost 
estimating and the contingency for the respective risks, it does not take into 
consideration the time value of money. In most cases, there is a time difference 
between the product delivery from the suppliers and the subcontractors, either 
positive in the form of trade credit or payment in advance mainly for 
importations. Management can address this problem by announcing the 
appropriate discount rate. Then, the range estimating can be applied not on the 
reported costs but on their Present Values.  
 
Figure 6 – Baseline Cost & Contingency Simulator subsystem 
 
 
3.3 Overhead Markup Calculator 
As discussed earlier in § 2.1.3, the inability to fairly allocate the indirect costs 
and especially the general overhead of the company to each bid, is the single 
most important factor of the Winner’s Curse. Both bidding and project teams 
tend to underestimate the indirect costs or even exclude them as they are rarely 
in a position to estimate them. Overhead budgeting and allocation are 
obligations of the top management and the financial department.  
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Two of the most common “textbook” methods to fairly allocate general 
overhead costs are the break-even volume of work analysis and the break-even 
contribution margin ratio analysis. In the Overhead Markup Calculator 
subsystem (Figure 7), the latter method is used to determine the overhead 
markup percentage of the baseline cost. The former method is used as a flag to 
check inconsistencies in the model.   
 
 
Figure 7 – Overhead Markup Calculator subsystem 
 
The Contribution Margin (CM) for a fiscal year is the total revenues minus the 
direct costs and the variable overhead. CM indicates the amount that its 
projects contributes to the company to pay for the General Overhead and to 
provide a profit for the stakeholders (11): 
𝐶𝑀 = 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑠 − 𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 − 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑑  
The CM Ratio is the CM divided by the total revenues: 
𝐶𝑀 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 =  
𝐶𝑀
𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑠
 
The overhead markup which is used in the subsystem is the estimated break-
even CM Ratio when profits are equal to zero: 
𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑑 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑢𝑝 (%) =  
𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑑 𝐵𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡 
𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘
∙ 100 
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Figure 8 – Break-even Contribution Margin Ratio 
 
The annual general overhead budget is the amount of money sufficient to cover 
all costs not directly related to any project and it is provided by the financial 
department. The annual anticipated volume of work is an estimate of the top 
management on the volume of work that the company can win based on 
internal (e.g. liquidity) and external factors (e.g. market conditions). The break-
even CM Ratio (Figure 8) is very important because it can directly affect the 
company’s performance: If it is understated, the company will not have 
sufficient funds to operate. If it is overstated, the resulted tender will be too 
high and the volume of work will decrease.  
The subsystem also receives a third input, the Historical Contribution Margin 
and generates a second output, the Break-even Volume of Work, both of which 
are not directly involved in the formation of the bid price. 
 
3.4 Late Payment Fee Simulator 
There are some serious implications in the transactions with the Greek public 
sector some of which are presented in the Introduction of the present 
dissertation. The most severe of these implications are the uncertainty and the 
irregularity involved in the cash inflows and the number of tax retentions, 
indirect taxes in public procurements, surety bonds and publication fees, each 
one of which generates a future cash flow. Although the information for the 
amount of these cash flows can be found in Invitation to Tender document, 
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information for the time is absent.  Furthermore, in spite of the fact that a 
legislation to protect the suppliers from late payment does exists, the legal 
process may further postpone payments for several years and thus, the best 
practice is to predict the date of the cash flows and charge accordingly. 
The Late Payment Fee Simulator subsystem (last component of Figure 9) uses 
the standard method of calculating the Net Present Value (36): 
𝑁𝑃𝑉 = −𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 ∙ (1 + 𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑑 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑢𝑝)
+ ∑
𝑁𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑎𝑡 𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑡𝑗
(1 +
𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒
365 )
𝑡𝑗
𝑗
+ 𝐿𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐹𝑒𝑒 
As the NPV here is not calculated for profit but rather as a compensation for late 
payment, the NPV is set to 0: 
0 = −𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 ∙ (1 + 𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑑 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑢𝑝)
+ ∑
𝑁𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑎𝑡 𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑡𝑗
(1 +
𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒
365 )
𝑡𝑗
+ 𝐿𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐹𝑒𝑒 
𝑗
⇒  𝐿𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐹𝑒𝑒 = 𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 ∙ 
(1 + 𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑑 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑢𝑝) − ∑
𝑁𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑎𝑡 𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑡𝑗
(1 +
𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒
365 )
𝑡𝑗
𝑗
 
The inputs to the subsystem are the nominal cash flows as reported in the 
Invitation to Tender, the PDFs of the respective expected date tj and the Interest 
Rate. As was the case in the Baseline Cost & Contingency subsystem, the 
expected date PDFs can vary in accuracy from rough estimates in the form of 
triangular distribution to detailed custom distribution based on a historical 
database. The interest rate, the appropriate level of which will be discussed in 
§ 5.3, is for the management to decide. The baseline cost component should not 
be discounted as it is already calculated as a present value.  
All cash flows participate in the Monte Carlo simulation and the result is the PDF 
of the NPV. The appropriate level of Late Payment Fee is a matter of the 
management’s risk attitude, which is input in the subsystem as a percentage of 
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level of confidence required for the fee to underrun. The concept of risk attitude 
was discussed earlier in § 3.1.  
 
Figure 9 – Minimum Acceptable Bid Calculation 
 
The system so far (Figure 9) calculates the first of the possible bid prices, the 
Minimum Acceptable Bid (MAB). MAB can be interpreted as the limit between 
the winner’s curse area and the profit area of all possible bid prices. If a 
company bids (and wins) in that price, it can cover all its expenses. However, 
MAB leaves no margin for profit and growth.   
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3.5 Winner’s Markup Simulator 
Avoiding bankruptcy, although very important nowadays, has been proved a 
poor strategy for every business sector and it is only one aspect of the bidding 
problem. The other one is to maximize profit and the probability to win. The 
probability to win has nothing to do with the internal affairs of a firm but with 
the competitors’ attitude. Given the fact that all competitors share the same 
suppliers and subcontractors, it can be assumed that the reported costs are the 
same for all competitors and thus, bidding price is a function of Markup: 
𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒(𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑢𝑝) = 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 +  𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 𝑥 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑢𝑝      
Friedman’s model of tendering theory (6) suggests that the bidding behavior of 
the competitors fall under normal distributions and that the probability to win 
for one competitor, is independent of winning the rest: 
𝑃𝑤𝑖𝑛 = 𝑃𝑤𝑖𝑛 1 𝑥 𝑃𝑤𝑖𝑛 2 𝑥 … 𝑥 𝑃𝑤𝑖𝑛 𝑁 
If a company has sufficient documented confrontations with a competitor, it can 
easily extract the mean and the standard deviation of its bidding behavior. Then, 
the Winner’s Markup (WM) under Friedman’s model can be easily simulated as: 
𝑊𝑀𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑁[𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑢𝑝𝑗], 𝑗 = 1,2, … , 𝑁  
The Monte Carlo simulators output would be the PDF of winning under different 
markup values if all competitors decide to choose the minimum possible 
markup (Figure 10): 
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Figure 10 – Friedman’s Model PDF 
However, Friedman’s model outcomes, referred as Lowest Responsive Bid 
Strategy, is only one of the possible strategies and there is evidence (37) that 
the Friedman’s markups are pessimistic and lower than the Gate’s model (7). 
Another strategy that results in higher markups is to choose the average markup 
of every possible confrontation. In this case, the Winner’s Markup can be 
simulated as: 
𝑊𝑀𝐴𝑣 =
1
𝑛
∑ 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑢𝑝𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1
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Figure 11 – Average Bid Strategy Cumulative Winner’s Markup 
 
Hosny and Elhakeem in (38) proposed a third strategy which results in markups 
that lie in between the two previous “extremes”. To simulate this “Closest But 
Below the Average (CBBA)” bid strategy’s winner’s markup, Hosny and 
Elhakeem define the Deviated Markup (DM) as: 
𝐷𝑀𝑖 =  𝑊𝑀𝐴𝑣 − 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑢𝑝𝑖 
To ensure that only below average DMs participate in the calculations, Penalized 
Deviated Markups (PDM) are also defined: 
𝑃𝐷𝑀𝑖 = {
𝐷𝑀𝑖 , 𝑖𝑓 𝐷𝑀𝑖 > 0
𝐷𝑀𝑖 + 1, 𝑖𝑓 𝐷𝑀𝑖 ≤ 0
 
The rational for the PDM is that it has no meaning to calculate deviations over 
the average as over the average markups can be considered loser markups. 
Then, the Winner’s Markup can be simulated as the one which deviates the least 
under the average markup: 
𝑊𝑀𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐴 = 𝑊𝑀𝐴𝑣 − 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑁[𝑃𝐷𝑀𝑗] 
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Figure 12 – CBBA Bid Strategy Cumulative Winner’s Markup 
 
 
3.6 Optimal Markup and Bid Strategy 
The PDFs resulting by simulating the Winner’s Markup PDFs under different 
strategies can be valuable tools in decision-making process for a bid. However, 
by themselves do not provide the answer as to which is the optimal price to bid. 
In both major models in tendering theory, Friedman’s and Gates’, the optimal 
markup is the one which maximizes the Expected Profit, where: 
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡 (𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑢𝑝) = 𝑃𝑤𝑖𝑛(𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑢𝑝)𝑥 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑢𝑝 
The optimal markup can be calculated by the previous results either by means 
of linear programming, or, to be consistent with the simplicity business 
requirement, by using the percentiles’ method described in the Appendix. 
Furthermore, a graphical approach can be used by plotting the expected profit 
versus its respective markup (Figure 13).  
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Figure 13 – Optimal Markup per Strategy 
In the example of Figure 10, the optimal markups (plot’s picks) for the three 
strategies, Lowest Responsive Bid, Closest But Below the Average Bid and 
Average Bid, are 8.25%, 9.47% and 11.96% respectively. At this stage, the 
problem of the price to bid turns to which strategy to decide.  
As it was clearly stated by the findings in the secondary sources in Estimating & 
Tendering chapter, the factors affecting the markup size are highly subjective 
and thus, hard to quantify. All these factors, which include degree of difficulty, 
current workload, need for work, contract conditions, client identity, 
completeness of the documents and so on, are consolidated as single qualitative 
input in the system, the level of attractiveness. The system can receive four 
levels of attractiveness: extremely attractive, very attractive, moderately 
attractive and slightly attractive.  
 
Figure 14 – Markup Prediction Subsystems 
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Based on the user response, the system follows the decision tree of Figure 15 to 
extract the final price to bid. The first decision which a company has to make is 
whether to bid or not. The system considers two reasons for not to bid. The first 
one is the project budget to be lower than the Minimum Acceptable Bid. The 
second is the Average Bid strategy’s optimal bid to be lower than the Minimum 
Acceptable Bid. In the first case loss is guaranteed and in the second there is no 
chance to win the bid. A third, possible more common, reason not to bid is the 
project to be no attractive at all, however it is not included in the system.  
 
Figure 15 – Decision Tree based on the level of Attractiveness 
 
The second step is to allocate the correct strategy according to the 
attractiveness response. Given the fact that the attractiveness measures the 
willingness to win and willingness to win means willingness to lower the profit 
margin, strategies are allocated according to the levels of markup which they 
produce. However, as the models primary concern is to protect the company 
from loss, if any of the strategies’ optimal price is below the Minimum 
Acceptable Bid, the price is automatically replaced by the Minimum Acceptable 
Bid itself. 
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Proof of Concept 
 
Ideally, the system should have been tested against many projects from various 
companies. However, all quantitative research attempts on how companies 
price their bids are facing the same challenge: Companies consider (and indeed 
it is) such information sensitive, participation levels fluctuate around 15% and 
many restrictions apply on what kind of information can be published. The fact 
that the author represents a direct competitor would only make things worse.  
All data for the evaluation of the system was retrieved from the archives of a 
single company in the ICT industry. The company agreed to provide the data for 
five projects which it won and three projects which it lost, as far as the actual 
figures are not revealed. All available projects concern government 
procurement for a single institution with budgets from 24.000€ to 50.000€. All 
assumptions made at the time of the initial estimate, were kept as inputs to the 
system.  
The performance of the proposed system on baseline cost estimating and on 
late payment fee estimating was tested against the initial and the actual costs 
of the five projects which the company won and completed.  Data from the 
three projects which the company lost were used to compare the markups 
resulted from the system with the actual first and second bid prices.  
The purpose of the results presented here is to be used as an indication of the 
system’s performance and functionality and under no circumstance should be 
generalized.   
 
4.1 Baseline Cost Estimating  
Both methods, the point estimates and the system’s output, are pretty accurate 
(Figure 16) because the time between the date of the estimate and the date of 
the order was between 30 and 47 days.  
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In four out of five cases the simulated results were nearer the real cost than the 
estimates. In one case the systems output was identical to the real cost of the 
project. The system seems to have a tendency to overestimate costs in every 
case by using the same data as a point estimate.  
Model’s performance could be vastly improved if historical data on the line item 
prices was available. Prediction models could be incorporated to predict more 
accurately the range estimates.  
 
 
Figure 16 – Baseline Cost % Error 
 
4.2 Late Payment Fee Estimating  
The figure underlines the vast uncertainty and irregularity concerning the public 
sector payments. The errors sky-rocketed from 4% in the cost estimates to up 
to 130% in late payment fee.  
As the uncertainty rises so does the system’s performance. The system’s 
outputs outperformed the point estimates in every case. In one case, the error 
was even half.  
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Figure 17 – Late Payment Fee % Error 
 
4.3 Markup and System Effectiveness 
The horizontal grey lines in Figure 18 represent the optimal markup per 
strategy: 8.25% for the Lowest Responsive Bid strategy, 9.47% for the Closest 
But Below the Average Bid strategy and 11.96% for the Average Bid strategy. As 
described earlier, the assumption for the calculation of the optimal bid for each 
strategy is that all bids fit in the normal distribution. However, the fact that the 
sample size, the number of encounters with the same three competitors 
available from the company, was 10, way lower than the minimum sample size 
of 30 in order to shape the normal distribution, by itself introduces inaccuracies.   
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Figure 18 – Markup Comparison 
The response of the company to the attractiveness of each project was 
“moderately attractive” for the first two projects and “very attractive” for 
project C. The system’s markups would be 9.47% for Project A, 9.47% for Project 
B and 8.25% for Project C. Compared with the actual winner’s markup, 10.59%, 
10.90% and 8.98% respectively, the system would win every bid.  
However, if the winner of every project, not the company, used the system to 
bid, the only outcome would be to further deviate from the actual “perfect” 
markup which would result in a price just a cent lower than the second bid. The 
fact that, because it is based on the Friedman’s model the system has the 
tendency to merit volume of work than profit margin, will be discussed in the 
Limitations section.     
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Conclusions & Limitations 
 
5.1 The System versus the Design Requirements and the Aim  
The previous chapter provides evidence that the use of the system can lead to 
more accurate estimates and to more winning bids. However, the system’s 
efficiency should be further evaluated against the dissertation’s aim and the 
design’s requirements.   
The first design requirement was for the system to have simple inputs. Indeed, 
the system has simple inputs in the sense of clearly defined inputs. However, 
considerable effort and knowledge is required, especially where inputs are in 
the form of probability density functions. As most of the inputs involved 
historical data, considerable effort are required to extract and maintain such 
data. On the other hand, knowledge is required to fit the historical data in a 
known distribution or to draw a custom distribution. Fortunately, there are 
tools, such as the Distribution Fitting function and the Distribution Artist tool of 
the @RISK simulation add-on, which can greatly facilitate the user.  
The second design requirement was that the user does not need to understand 
the theory and the methods involved in order to use the system.  Figure 19 
illustrates the whole system as a black box with a number of inputs and a single 
output and as such may be faced by the user. The only prerequisites are the 
understanding of the inputs and the system limitations which are to be 
discussed in the next paragraph.  
The requirement that the system will take into consideration commercial 
exigencies is fulfilled through the introduction of the Attractiveness. Although 
the system is designed for four levels of attractiveness, more intermediate 
levels can be applied. The level of attractiveness of each project can be further 
rationalized by the use of a balanced scorecard where every condition, e.g. need 
for work and client identity, receives scores for importance and weight. 
According to the sum of all products, the project receives a level of 
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attractiveness for the company. The rather vague concept of attractiveness has 
also the advantage of being industry and company independent, with each user 
to be able to define attractiveness according to his need and  will. Furthermore, 
some other easily quantifiable aspects of commercial exigencies such as project 
cash flow, contract conditions and risk are fed into the system either directly, 
e.g. project cash flow, or indirectly through the risk attitude and the rates inputs.   
The fourth design requirement was that the system will take into consideration 
market competition. In fact, a great part of the system is built around market 
competition. Apart from the extreme case where the optimum markup for a 
given strategy results in a price which is lower than the minimum acceptable 
bid, market competition is the only shaping factor of the output price.   
Another consideration during the design was the system to use only information 
that is used in practice. The fact is that the system is using information that may 
not be readily available to a typical company. However, the required 
information may be gathered through existing documentation. For example, 
detailed statistics for the days sales outstanding per client can be collected by 
comparing invoices with the bank account statements. One way or another, in 
the proof of concept chapter, the system was proved to be more accurate than 
conventional estimating even when the same experience and intuition based 
assumptions are made. However, the system’s performance and accuracy will 
increase as the data provided by the user is based on facts rather than 
experience.  
The last business requirement was for the system to be inexpensive. It seems 
that the most obvious way to keep the cost low is to use only readily available 
software and hardware. The whole system is based on four components: a 
typical personal computer’s hardware, an operating system, a spreadsheet 
application and a Monte Carlo simulation add-on for the spreadsheet 
application. The system which was used to run the examples in the Proof of 
Concept chapter would have cost to the company well under 2,500 euros. If the 
company used the system to win any of the three lost projects, the profit would 
substantially outweigh the cost many times over.  
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Finally, the system should be evaluated against the aim of the dissertation which 
is “to develop a system which generates the optimal bid price for the sealed-bid 
procurements of the public sector in Greece. The system should be strictly 
based on research findings and scientific methods but it should be oriented to 
the general practitioner in the ICT industry”. The system does generates the 
optimal bid price for the sealed-bid procurements based strictly on scientific 
methods and, as illustrated earlier in the paragraph, it is oriented to the general 
practitioner by taking into account the research findings on the factors and the 
methods which affect the tendering decisions in practice. Moreover, although 
the special needs of the ICT industry and the special conditions prevailing in the 
Greek public sector were taken into consideration during the design, there is no 
reason to restrict the system’s use to a particular industry or context.  
 
5.2 Limitations & Paradoxes 
The system is nothing but a tool and as such the user should take into 
consideration that there are certain limitations. The most critical of the system’s 
limitations derive from its three basic assumptions: 
i. All competitors are known to the user. 
ii. Baseline cost is the same for all competitors. 
iii. Competitors’ markup behavior follows a known PDF. 
In fact, based on the Greek legislation, the number and the identity of the 
competitors in any competition are unknown to the participants. The only way 
to gain access to such information is, illegally, through the authority itself. So, 
the system’s output will be as accurate as the user’s prediction of the number 
and the identity of the competitors. 
In an ideal world, all competitors in an area would have access to the same pool 
of suppliers and at the same cost. In reality and especially in the ICT industry, 
only the first leg is true. In the ICT industry, a project’s cost is not controlled by 
the direct suppliers, a.k.a. the distributors, but by the vendors. Vendors can and 
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will bonus one of the competitors either in a first-come first-served fashion, e.g. 
Lexmark, or based on the level of the firm’s affiliation or partnership status, e.g. 
HP, or based on a combination of the first two, e.g. Cisco. In any case, the 
competitor who first who knows about the technical details of a procurement 
has a great competitive advantage and it usually happens long before the 
publication of the Invitation to Tender. 
Even if the first two of the basic assumptions are true, the third is not. For a 
competitor’s markup behavior to follow one of the known PDFs, e.g. the normal 
distribution, it means that the competitor picks a distribution and follows it 
faithfully without reacting to the market conditions. However, as it was 
illustrated before, each competitor’s markup choice, is a nearly random process 
based on experience and intuition.   
Moreover, as the system is based on Friedman’s model, it tends to produce 
lower markups. It is very good to increase volume of work but it lowers the profit 
margin. Increased volume of work is not always good because it increases 
exposure to late payments.  
Based on the last two limitations, the system itself can start a price war: the 
system tends to produce low markups and the user would win bids. Although 
tendering models suggest that markups do not change over time, in reality 
competitors will lower their markups, too. The new lower competitors’ markups 
would be fed into the system which in response will produce even lower 
markups. Given sufficient time and cretinism, every company would bid in what 
it considers its Minimum Acceptable Bid with no profit margin whatsoever.  
Furthermore, the system faces the company in a survival, passive state where 
competitors shape the prices, not the company itself. As the system’s price 
threshold, which is directly related to the company’s internals, is the Minimum 
Acceptable Bid and the Minimum Acceptable Bid is a function of the company’s 
efficiency, the more efficient the company, the less the system takes it into 
consideration.   
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Another paradox of the system’s use derives from its only qualitative input, the 
Attractiveness and the fact that the system chooses the Minimum Acceptable 
Bid as the bid price for extremely attractive projects. If a company follows the 
proposed system and it is blessed enough to face only extremely attractive 
projects, it is condemned to produce no profits. Maybe, a more realistic point 
of view to the system would be as a tool to decision making: Do not bid lower 
than the Minimum Acceptable Bid, name a markup and check the probabilities 
of winning from the output of the Winner’s Markup Simulator subsystem. 
Yet another limitation of the system is that, as is the case with every other 
system, it is prone to the GIGO effect. Every system’s output is as good and 
accurate as the inputs that the user provides (Garbage In, Garbage Out). 
Perhaps, the system’s greatest limitation is the possibility that a user may be 
tempted to blindly follow the output (Garbage In, Gospel Out).   
Finally, no system can face and no company can ignore the fact that in 2002, for 
instance, only 16% of governmental calls to tender were published – government 
procurement has been called "the weakest link in the common market" (2). The 
16% figure is referred to the EU market as a whole. The author’s sense is that 
the figure in Greece might be even worse and that the 84% of the unpublished 
calls to tender provided contracts with much higher margin than the 16% ones. 
This last fact might explain the fact that there is so little interest on a 
systematized approach of the bidding process.  
 
5.3 Managerial Implications  
Both the system’s limitations and the system’s inputs underline the managerial 
nature of the bid pricing. Out of the fourteen system inputs only one, the 
historical contribution margin, is not directly influenced by any present 
managerial decision.  
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Figure 19 – The System 
 
As illustrated in Figure 19, the system’s inputs can be grouped in three 
categories: the uncertain data, the reported data and the managerial decisions. 
All inputs under the uncertain data category require accurate PDFs to produce 
an equally accurate output. For the cost range estimate and the range estimate 
of days in credit the system can use the triangular distribution as a fairly 
accurate assumption only in the event of absence of historical data. The same is 
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true for the competitors’ markup which was presented as normal distributions 
in the proof-of-concept examples. If the company provides enough historical 
data to the system, custom distributions can be extracted by the simulation add-
ons. Historical data should be maintained at any cost. The system’s performance 
and accuracy are expected to increase as historical data accumulates. However, 
it is a strictly managerial responsibility to provide the policies and the resources 
required for the company to faithfully maintain historical databases of all past 
encounters. 
Moreover, the system draws the lines of what makes a company efficient: lower 
costs per line item, longer trade credit per line item, lower general overhead, 
higher anticipated volume of work and shorter days in credit. As described in 
the previous paragraph, lower cost per line item can be only achieved through 
the vendors. Management should aim to improve the company’s partnership 
status with the vendors and to improve the relations of the company with the 
authorities in order to gain early access to the technical details of forthcoming 
ITTs. By improving relations with the authorities, management may further 
improve the company’s efficiency by getting access to the 84% of the 
unpublished calls to tender and thus increase the company’s margin. In many 
cases, it can even merit the days in credit as first-come, first-served is rarely the 
norm in the Greek public sector payments. Furthermore, longer trade credit per 
line item can be achieved by improving relations with the direct suppliers. 
Usually improved relations means strategic decisions such as higher trading 
volume to a more restricted number of suppliers. 
Not only the inputs but also the output can provide valuable information about 
a company’s efficiency. If the simulator systematically produces Minimum 
Acceptable Bid as the Optimal Bid Price in situations where the Attractiveness 
is not set to Extremely, then the company’s efficiency is very low in comparison 
to its competition. In other words, where the competitors manage to cover all 
their expenses and have profits through past markups, the user fails and it needs 
to further increase the price with no profit at all. Usually, this means either too 
high general overhead or very low anticipated volume of work. In both cases, 
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the company’s future is in jeopardy and it needs immediate management 
actions to mitigate these circumstances either by cost cutting or by increasing 
the anticipated volume of work. In money intensive industries where the 
supplier finances the client, to increase the anticipated volume of work, 
management should either create debt or sell equity, or look for other sources 
of revenues.   
Finally, the relation of the last group of inputs, Managerial Decisions, with 
management is self-explanatory. Discount and interest rates levels, although far 
beyond the scope of the present dissertation, can vastly affect the price to bid. 
It is for the management to make the very difficult decision to pick among risk-
free rates, weighted average cost of capital, opportunity cost of capital, 
minimum attractive rate of return or any other rate ever proposed for the 
denominator of the NVP. The choice can vary from as low as 1.5% to as high as 
20%. The same stands true for the inputs of Risk Attitude and Attractiveness as 
they represent the management’s will and understanding of their environment.  
Perhaps, the most important advantage of the system’s use will be the fact that 
the inputs force senior management to get involved and take responsibility for 
the outcome.  
 
5.4 Future Work 
The general essence about estimating and tendering is that it is a technical art 
and as such it receives little attention from academia. Sources and references 
are scarce and most of the bibliography, rooted in the second half of the 
previous century, out of print. However, as the topic is involved in a roughly 10-
20% of any country’s GDP, if it is addressed as a managerial science, the pre-
project functions may gain both academic and commercial interest. 
Quantitative research in the tendering practice in various countries and 
different sectors, direct comparison of the effectiveness of the distinct methods 
and models on the estimating function and the tendering function on real 
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projects and even the development of more elaborate models would be only 
some of the research topics on the subject.  
Moreover, the operation of the system resulted by the present dissertation is 
suggestive but not even nearly exhaustive. The system may be modified to 
include more elaborate options for labor and time, in other words to be more 
project than procurement oriented, more models on the tendering theory, 
more strategies than the basic four etc. Ultimately, the system could be 
developed as a stand-alone commercial software which would include any 
historical database required with automated distribution-fitting function and 
integrated Monte Carlo simulator.  
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Appendix  
Notes on the Implementation 
 
The proposed system was implemented using Microsoft Excel 2007 and the 
Palisade’s @RISK 5.5 free trial version which is fully functional for 15 days. 
@RISK is a Montel Carlo simulation add-on for Microsoft Excel (Figure A4) which 
uses a Mersenne twister pseudo-random number generator and Latin 
Hypercube sampling. Latin Hypercube sampling requires less computing power 
to produce identical results compared with the traditional Monte Carlo 
sampling.  
Figure A1 illustrates a snapshot of the system’s interface. Simulation outputs 
are marked in red.  
 
Figure A 1 – Optimal Bid Simulator (OBS) Environment 
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 The process starts when the user feeds the system with the inputs of the 
Managerial Decisions and the Financial Inputs groups (Figure A2).  
 
Figure A 2 – Managerial & Financial Inputs 
 
The user should also fill the Bill of Quantities (Figure A3) with the description, 
the quantity, the trade credit in days and the reported unit cost of each line 
item, the optimistic unit cost and the pessimistic unit cost. Then the system 
calculates the total reported cost, the respective present values and the 0.2% 
benchmark to decide which of the line items are critical. If a line item is critical, 
it participates in the simulation as a triangular distribution of its present values. 
The non-critical items participates in the simulation as constants with their 
reported cost: 
=IF(J14>$E$25,RiskTriang(E14,D14,F14,RiskStatic(D14))
,D14) 
 
Figure A 3 – Bill of Quantities 
 
Figure A 4 – Palisade’s @Risk Excel Add-on Strip 
~ 57 ~ 
 
The Late Payment Fee Simulator inputs are the description, the percentage of 
the total cash inflows which represents the specific cash flow and of course, the 
days in credit and their optimistic and pessimistic counterparts. All line items in 
the table below, participates in the simulation as triangular distributions.  
 
Figure A 5 – Late Payment Fee Subsystem Inputs 
 
The last set of user inputs are the means and the standard deviations for the 
definition of the competitors’ markup normal distributions (Figure A6).  
 
Figure A 6 – Winner’s Markup Simulator Subsystem Inputs 
 
Figure A7 illustrates the outputs of the winner’s markup and optimal markup 
subsystems. The winner’s markup per strategy outputs are in a form of density 
functions which are illustrated in Figures A12, A13 and A14 respectively. For 
reference, the system also outputs the actual optimal bid prices per strategy.  
 
Figure A 7 – Winner’s Markup & Optimal Markup per Strategy Outputs 
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The most difficult part of the system’s implementation was the automated 
identification of the optimal markup per strategy as neither the graphical 
approach of Figure 13, nor the calculation of the area of a PDF (Figure 3) are 
options in Excel. To extract the optimal markup, a new table was created with 
the markup value of each percentile and the respective probability of win: 
=RiskPercentile($E$37,A49). Then, the expected profit was 
calculated for each line as the product of the two. Figure A8 illustrates a fraction 
of the table. 
 
Figure A 8 – Optimal Markup Calculation 
A lookup function was incorporated to find the maximum expected profit for 
each strategy: =MAX(F49:F149. Finally, the optimal markup can be found as 
the markup which maximizes the expected profit: =OFFSET(G49,MATCH 
(G46,G49:G149,0),-4). 
Figure A9 depicts the system’s outputs. The decision tree of Figure 15 was 
implemented as the function: =IF(B2="No Bid", "No Bid", 
IF(E7="Extremely",B4,IF(AND(E7="Very",B4<E42),E42,IF(AND(E
7="Very",B4>E42),B4,IF(AND(E7="Moderately",B4<F42),F42,IF(
AND(E7="Moderately",B4>F42),B4,IF(E7="Slightly",G42))))))) 
 
Figure A 9 – Model’s Output 
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Figures A10 through A16 are a sample of what consists an @RISK Quick Report 
of the example.  
 
 
Figure A 10 - @RISK Output Report for Total Reported PV 
@RISK Output Report for Total Reported PV 
Performed By: Christos
Date: Tuesday, August 20, 2013 1:25:47 PM
Workbook Name OBS.xlsx
Number of Simulations 1
Number of Iterations 10000
Number of Inputs 19
Number of Outputs 5
Sampling Type Latin Hypercube
Simulation Start Time
Simulation Duration
Random # Generator
Random Seed
Statistics Percentile
Minimum 215.414,31 € 5% 233.000,64 €
Maximum 284.950,01 € 10% 236.360,19 €
Mean 250.052,48 € 15% 238.797,38 €
Std Dev 10.738,70 € 20% 240.820,70 €
Variance 115319716,1 25% 242.452,70 €
Skewness 0,150608059 30% 244.020,23 €
Kurtosis 2,756115083 35% 245.464,76 €
Median 249.587,37 € 40% 246.810,58 €
Mode 252.709,10 € 45% 248.249,50 €
Left X 233.000,64 € 50% 249.587,37 €
Left P 5% 55% 251.045,06 €
Right X 268.570,55 € 60% 252.592,41 €
Right P 95% 65% 253.935,65 €
Diff X 35.569,91 € 70% 255.533,29 €
Diff P 90% 75% 257.379,80 €
#Errors 0 80% 259.190,83 €
Filter Min Off 85% 261.579,56 €
Filter Max Off 90% 264.471,43 €
#Filtered 0 95% 268.570,55 €
Rank Name Regr Corr
1 Line Item 3 / Unit Cost0,776 0,760
2 Line Item 1 / Unit Cost0,468 0,441
3 Line Item 2 / Unit Cost0,432 0,420
4 Unit Cost 0,000 0
5 Unit Cost 0,000 0
6 Unit Cost 0,000 0
7 Unit Cost 0,000 0
8 Unit Cost 0,000 0
9 Unit Cost 0,000 0
10 Unit Cost 0,000 0
11 Unit Cost 0,000 0
Simulation Summary Information
Regression and Rank Information for Total Reported PV
8/20/13 13:24:08
00:00:08
Mersenne Twister
431154747
Summary Statistics for Total Reported PV
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Figure A 11 - @RISK Output Report for Negative NPV 
@RISK Output Report for Cash Flow 1 / Negative NPV 
Performed By: Christos
Date: Tuesday, August 20, 2013 1:25:48 PM
Workbook Name OBS.xlsx
Number of Simulations 1
Number of Iterations 10000
Number of Inputs 19
Number of Outputs 5
Sampling Type Latin Hypercube
Simulation Start Time
Simulation Duration
Random # Generator
Random Seed
Statistics Percentile
Minimum -1.932,34 € 5% -1.653,42 €
Maximum -790,92 € 10% -1.575,79 €
Mean -1.321,69 € 15% -1.522,85 €
Std Dev 188,70 € 20% -1.484,72 €
Variance 35607,48169 25% -1.449,12 €
Skewness -0,252326856 30% -1.417,67 €
Kurtosis 2,725643725 35% -1.387,45 €
Median -1.311,06 € 40% -1.360,65 €
Mode -1.240,80 € 45% -1.335,43 €
Left X -1.653,42 € 50% -1.311,06 €
Left P 5% 55% -1.286,15 €
Right X -1.027,16 € 60% -1.261,02 €
Right P 95% 65% -1.238,80 €
Diff X 626,27 € 70% -1.213,34 €
Diff P 90% 75% -1.186,21 €
#Errors 0 80% -1.156,34 €
Filter Min Off 85% -1.124,22 €
Filter Max Off 90% -1.083,73 €
#Filtered 0 95% -1.027,16 €
Rank Name Regr Corr
1 Cash Flow 1 / Days-0,720 -0,714
2 Cash Flow 2 / Days-0,683 -0,681
3 Days 0,000 0
4 Intermediate PV of BL Cost + Contingency (Bug): / Days0,000 0
5 Days 0,000 0
Simulation Summary Information
Regression and Rank Information for Cash Flow 1 / Negative NPV
8/20/13 13:24:08
00:00:08
Mersenne Twister
431154747
Summary Statistics for Cash Flow 1 / Negative NPV
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Figure A 12 - @RISK Output Report for Lowest Responsive Winner’s Markup 
@RISK Output Report for Lowest Responsive WM 
Performed By: Christos
Date: Tuesday, August 20, 2013 1:25:49 PM
Workbook Name OBS.xlsx
Number of Simulations 1
Number of Iterations 10000
Number of Inputs 19
Number of Outputs 5
Sampling Type Latin Hypercube
Simulation Start Time
Simulation Duration
Random # Generator
Random Seed
Statistics Percentile
Minimum 4,19% 5% 14,16%
Maximum 23,89% 10% 15,38%
Mean 17,87% 15% 16,06%
Std Dev 2,03% 20% 16,51%
Variance 0,000413633 25% 16,88%
Skewness -1,105059493 30% 17,17%
Kurtosis 5,792211601 35% 17,44%
Median 18,11% 40% 17,67%
Mode 18,76% 45% 17,89%
Left X 14,16% 50% 18,11%
Left P 5% 55% 18,32%
Right X 20,65% 60% 18,53%
Right P 95% 65% 18,74%
Diff X 6,49% 70% 18,96%
Diff P 90% 75% 19,21%
#Errors 0 80% 19,47%
Filter Min Off 85% 19,75%
Filter Max Off 90% 20,11%
#Filtered 0 95% 20,65%
Rank Name Regr Corr
1 Average / Markup0,474 0,375
2 Optimal Markup per Strategy / Markup0,435 0,537
3 Competitor 1 / Markup0,342 0,341
Simulation Summary Information
Regression and Rank Information for Lowest Responsive WM
8/20/13 13:24:08
00:00:08
Mersenne Twister
431154747
Summary Statistics for Lowest Responsive WM
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Figure A 13 - @RISK Output Report for CBBA Winner’s Markup 
@RISK Output Report for Below Average WM 
Performed By: Christos
Date: Tuesday, August 20, 2013 1:25:50 PM
Workbook Name OBS.xlsx
Number of Simulations 1
Number of Iterations 10000
Number of Inputs 19
Number of Outputs 5
Sampling Type Latin Hypercube
Simulation Start Time
Simulation Duration
Random # Generator
Random Seed
Statistics Percentile
Minimum 4,19% 5% 14,79%
Maximum 27,68% 10% 16,20%
Mean 18,94% 15% 16,90%
Std Dev 2,35% 20% 17,36%
Variance 0,000554593 25% 17,74%
Skewness -0,848305724 30% 18,06%
Kurtosis 5,464027609 35% 18,35%
Median 19,11% 40% 18,62%
Mode 18,95% 45% 18,88%
Left X 14,79% 50% 19,11%
Left P 5% 55% 19,36%
Right X 22,44% 60% 19,60%
Right P 95% 65% 19,84%
Diff X 7,65% 70% 20,11%
Diff P 90% 75% 20,40%
#Errors 0 80% 20,71%
Filter Min Off 85% 21,10%
Filter Max Off 90% 21,61%
#Filtered 0 95% 22,44%
Rank Name Regr Corr
1 Average / Markup0,606 0,527
2 Optimal Markup per Strategy / Markup0,316 0,416
3 Competitor 1 / Markup0,286 0,263
Simulation Summary Information
Regression and Rank Information for Below Average WM
8/20/13 13:24:08
00:00:08
Mersenne Twister
431154747
Summary Statistics for Below Average WM
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Figure A 14 - @RISK Output Report for Average Winner’s Markup 
@RISK Output Report for Average WM 
Performed By: Christos
Date: Tuesday, August 20, 2013 1:25:50 PM
Workbook Name OBS.xlsx
Number of Simulations 1
Number of Iterations 10000
Number of Inputs 19
Number of Outputs 5
Sampling Type Latin Hypercube
Simulation Start Time
Simulation Duration
Random # Generator
Random Seed
Statistics Percentile
Minimum 14,13% 5% 17,72%
Maximum 29,53% 10% 18,46%
Mean 21,00% 15% 18,91%
Std Dev 2,01% 20% 19,32%
Variance 0,000402195 25% 19,63%
Skewness 0,002950059 30% 19,93%
Kurtosis 2,959813692 35% 20,19%
Median 20,98% 40% 20,48%
Mode 20,61% 45% 20,73%
Left X 17,72% 50% 20,98%
Left P 5% 55% 21,24%
Right X 24,29% 60% 21,50%
Right P 95% 65% 21,77%
Diff X 6,58% 70% 22,06%
Diff P 90% 75% 22,36%
#Errors 0 80% 22,71%
Filter Min Off 85% 23,11%
Filter Max Off 90% 23,58%
#Filtered 0 95% 24,29%
Rank Name Regr Corr
1 Average / Markup0,831 0,819
2 Competitor 1 / Markup0,499 0,475
3 Optimal Markup per Strategy / Markup0,249 0,245
Simulation Summary Information
Regression and Rank Information for Average WM
8/20/13 13:24:08
00:00:08
Mersenne Twister
431154747
Summary Statistics for Average WM
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Figure A 15 - @RISK Model Inputs 
@RISK Model Inputs
Performed By: Christos
Date: Tuesday, August 20, 2013 1:25:51 PM
Name Cell Graph Function Min Mean Max
Days J31 RiskTriang(D31,C31,E31,RiskStatic(C31)) 0 0 0
Days J33 RiskTriang(D33,C33,E33,RiskStatic(C33)) 0 0 0
Unit Cost K16 RiskTriang(E16,D16,F16,RiskStatic(D16)) n/a n/a n/a
Unit Cost K17 RiskTriang(E17,D17,F17,RiskStatic(D17)) n/a n/a n/a
Unit Cost K18 RiskTriang(E18,D18,F18,RiskStatic(D18)) n/a n/a n/a
Unit Cost K19 RiskTriang(E19,D19,F19,RiskStatic(D19)) n/a n/a n/a
Unit Cost K20 RiskTriang(E20,D20,F20,RiskStatic(D20)) n/a n/a n/a
Unit Cost K21 RiskTriang(E21,D21,F21,RiskStatic(D21)) n/a n/a n/a
Unit Cost K22 RiskTriang(E22,D22,F22,RiskStatic(D22)) n/a n/a n/a
Unit Cost K23 RiskTriang(E23,D23,F23,RiskStatic(D23)) n/a n/a n/a
Category: Average
Average / Markup J40 RiskNormal(B40,C40) -∞ 0,23 +∞
Category: Cash Flow 1
Cash Flow 1 / Days J29 RiskTriang(D29,C29,E29,RiskStatic(C29)) 90 136,6667 200
Category: Cash Flow 2
Cash Flow 2 / Days J30 RiskTriang(D30,C30,E30,RiskStatic(C30)) 150 350 600
Category: Competitor 1
Competitor 1 / Markup J38 RiskNormal(B38,C38) -∞ 0,21 +∞
Category: Intermediate PV of BL Cost + Contingency (Bug):
Intermediate PV of BL Cost + 
Contingency (Bug): / Days
J32 RiskTriang(D32,C32,E32,RiskStatic(C32)) 0 0 0
Category: Line Item 1
Line Item 1 / Unit Cost K13 RiskTriang(E13,D13,F13,RiskStatic(D13)) 8.500,00 € 9.833,33 € 11.000,00 €
Category: Line Item 2
Line Item 2 / Unit Cost K14 RiskTriang(E14,D14,F14,RiskStatic(D14)) 4.000,00 € 4.833,33 € 5.500,00 €
Category: Line Item 3
Line Item 3 / Unit Cost K15 RiskTriang(E15,D15,F15,RiskStatic(D15)) 22.000,00 € 27.333,33 € 35.000,00 €
Category: Optimal Markup per Strategy
Optimal Markup per Strategy / 
Markup
J39 RiskNormal(B39,C39) -∞ 0,19 +∞
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Figure A 16 - @RISK Model Outputs 
 
 
@RISK Model Outputs
Performed By: Christos
Date: Tuesday, August 20, 2013 1:25:53 PM
Name Cell Function
Lowest Responsive WM E37 RiskOutput("Lowest Responsive WM")
Below Average WM F37 RiskOutput("Below Average WM")
Cash Flow 1 / Negative NPV G29 RiskOutput()
Average WM G37 RiskOutput("Average WM")
Total Reported PV H25 RiskOutput("Total Reported PV")
